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Non-Technical Summary
Governments are subject to a number of constraints that affect their ability to set fiscal policy optimally. This paper considers two. Firstly, governments are inevitably imperfectly informed about the production technology of firms and household preferences which both determine what level and what composition of public spending are optimal. Secondly, governments are constrained in their ability to change various elements of fiscal policy, due to, for example, quasi-fixed expenditure items such as social welfare benefits linked to entitlement conditions and interest payments that depend on the stock of public debt accumulated in the past. Other factors that constrain governments in this respect include limited administrative capacity (governments are only able to concentrate on a limited number of issues at a time) and limited political capital required for fiscal changes. We refer to this type of constraint as budget rigidities.
In this paper we derive the optimal level and the optimal composition of public spending in the situation in which governments are constrained in their ability to alter both and know little about the relative growth benefits of different public spending categories. As a theoretical framework, we use endogenous growth models with public finance in which fiscal policy affects the long-run growth rate of the economy. Previous papers that have used this class of models typically ignore these constraints on governments, and assume that private and public inputs are substitutes.
We generate a number of interesting results with respect to optimal fiscal policy in the presence of budget rigidities, informational limitations, or both in the realistic case when private and public inputs to private production that are provided by the government are complements. First, we show that the optimal level of productive public spending and the composition are interrelated: in particular, the optimal level of spending is higher when the composition is suboptimal, and the optimal share of public resources allocated to public investment may be very low when the level of spending is either too high or too low due to budget rigidities. This result contrasts with the common perception that public investment is the most important public spending category for long-run growth.
Secondly, we show that imperfect knowledge of the government is much more likely a constraining factor for fiscal policy with complementarity. The number of parameters that determine optimal fiscal policy increases compared to the case when public and private inputs are substitutes, and some model parameters which are commonly perceived not to impact on optimal fiscal policy in some cases are shown to play indeed a role. These results demonstrate that determining optimal fiscal policy even under growth maximization is highly complex in practice since for some of these parameters robust empirical estimates are not available and again contrast with the more simple but likely unrealistic case of substitutability.
The third contribution is to analyze fiscal reform when governments are imperfectly informed and when budget rigidities imply that the government is only able to implement piecemeal fiscal policy changes which take the existing fiscal policy as its starting point. Given that the optimal fiscal policy parameter values are unknown, the optimal size and direction of fiscal policy parameter changes are both unclear. We then show that by limiting the magnitude of policy parameter changes, budget rigidities in fact reduce informational requirement so that in most situations, the design of optimal fiscal reform only requires information about the direction of change but not about its magnitude. We further stress the need for better information by showing that with complementarity, fiscal reforms are more likely to reduce rather than to augment long-run growth. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze

Introduction
Governments are subject to a number of constraints that a¤ect their ability to set …scal policy optimally. This paper considers two. Firstly, governments are inevitably imperfectly informed about the production technology of …rms and household preferences. The importance of imperfect information for macroeconomic policy more generally is increasingly recognized. In the context of monetary policy, Greenspan (2004, p.39) notes that "policymakers often have to act, or choose not to act, even though we may not fully understand the full range of possible outcomes, let alone each possible outcome's likelihood". Phelps (2007, p.xix) proposes that "issues have to be rethought in a way that makes the ever-imperfect knowledge of [...] policymakers an integral part of the analysis". 1 In relation to …scal policy, imperfect information is also often seen as an important source of second-best situations (Lipsey (2007) ). Since Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) , it is well known that second-best interactions may imply that …rst-best policies are not desirable, and that the rules for optimal policy change. There is a large literature on optimal taxation and other issues in public economics which addresses second-best problems. However, the existing literature on optimal taxation typically assumes that public spending requirements are exogenously given (Renström (1999) ).
Secondly, governments are constrained in their ability to change various elements of …scal policy, due to, for example, quasi-…xed expenditure items such as social welfare bene…ts linked to entitlement conditions, interest payments that depend on the previously accumulated stock of public debt, and the wages of public employees. Mattina and Gunnarsson (2007) estimate that the share of spending that is non- ‡exible due to legal obligations (which includes social bene…ts, interest payments, compensation of public employees, and subsidies) amounts to 72% in Slovenia. This …gure may even be an underestimate of the true extent of non- ‡exible public spending: the ability of the government to change …scal policy is also constrained by limited ad-ministrative capacity (governments are only able to concentrate on a limited number of issues at a time) and by limited political capital required for …scal changes (most public spending categories have bene…ciaries and hence lobbies that may oppose change and therefore try to in ‡uence policy makers). We refer to this type of constraint as budget rigidities. Given the underlying causes of budget rigidities, it seems plausible that they persist in the long run.
In this paper we consider the impact of budget rigidities and imperfect knowledge on optimal …scal policy, speci…cally the optimal level and the optimal composition of public spending, using an endogenous growth models with public …nance under growth maximization.
2 Given that governments may be constrained in their ability to alter either total productive public spending or its mix and may know little about the relative growth bene…ts of di¤erent public spending categories, these models, because they allow for the inclusion of the productive e¤ects of several public spending categories, offer a potentially interesting addition to the literature. 3 This paper therefore extends the endogenous growth-public …nance literature by explicitly considering imperfect information and budget rigidities as constraints for the government. In some ways, it is similar to García Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2005) who consider enforcement problems as an alternative constraint on …scal policy which makes capital income taxation desirable in contrast to a …rst-best situation where in the long run, it is optimal to completely shift the burden from factor income taxation from capital to labor.
The model we develop considers two distinct productive public spending categories, public services and public capital, so that the level of public 2 As shown by Misch et al. (2008a) , growth maximization is often a reasonable close proxy of welfare maximization and often easier to compute. 3 Despite their prevalence in practice and despite the fact that they give rise to the possibility of second-best outcomes, informational limitations and budget rigidities have not previously been considered in models of this type. Existing papers instead derive the rules for the optimal volume and composition of public spending in the absence of such constraints on government. The only implicit constraint that these models impose on the government is the fact that lump sum taxation is not available and that economic agents take taxes and public spending as given so that we consider these rules for …scal policy as …rst-best. We recognize however that frequently, the unavailability of lump-sum taxes within a market economy is considered as a source of second-best situations. spending does not need to be exogenously …xed. The government uses a ‡at income tax to …nance public spending; in this sense, we hold the structure of taxation constant. Our model di¤ers from those found in the literature in the sense that it considers various model features introduced separately by the literature on endogenous growth models with public …nance in a single framework: in the model we develop, the governments provides public services and accumulates public capital similarly to Tsoukis and Miller (2003) and by Ghosh and Roy (2004) , private and public inputs are complements as in Devarajan et al. (1996) , the e¢ ciency of public spending is considered as Agénor (2010) for example, and we model the production of public services in greater detail similarly to Agénor (2008b) for example.
In this setup, it is realistic to assume that there are essentially information asymmetries: private agents are perfectly informed in the sense that they have full knowledge of their preference and technology parameters and that they obviously observe …scal policy. In contrast, governments can reasonably be assumed to be imperfectly informed about the technology of production and household preferences in the sense that they do not know their exact values because exact empirical estimates are often di¢ cult to …nd.
From these modi…cations to the standard setup, we generate a number of interesting results with respect to optimal …scal policy in the presence of budget rigidities, informational limitations, or both. Firstly, in contrast to the case of CES technology, Cobb-Douglas technology assumed in most endogenous growth models with public …nance has counterintuitive implications when either the level of public spending or the composition of public spending is …xed due to budget rigidities, or when public spending is not e¢ cient under the objective of growth maximization. As a simple example, consider the case when there is one public expenditure category with productive effects and one that is not productive, and when the level of productive public spending is currently at its growth-maximizing level. Reallocating a greater share of public resources towards the unproductive public spending category implies that the level of total public spending is no longer optimal and must be increased to ensure that the level of productive public spending remains at its optimum. However, with two di¤erent productive public expenditure cat-egories and Cobb-Douglas technology, the growth-maximizing level and the growth-maximizing composition are independent of each other contrary to what this simple example would suggest. Further, the technical e¢ ciency of public spending does not have an impact either. In contrast, when CES technology is assumed, the optimal level of productive public spending depends on its composition and vice versa, and the technical e¢ ciency of public spending matters. In particular, it is shown that the second-best level of taxation is higher when the composition is suboptimal, and that the second-best share of public resources allocated to public investment may be very low when the level of taxation (i.e. the level of public spending) is either below or above its …rst-best level (we assume that a …rst-best situation corresponds to the case where the government is fully informed about all technology and preference parameters and where all policy parameters are fully ‡exible). Similar results arise when public spending is not e¢ cient. These are additional, but very simple and intuitive, cases of second-best interaction in public …nance that have largely been ignored in the literature. These results are also consistent with Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) who …nd that increasing the share of current spending at the expense of capital spending is growth-enhancing using data from developing countries.
Secondly, we show that imperfect knowledge of the government is much more likely a constraining factor for …scal policy under CES technology when inputs to private production are complements. With Cobb-Douglas technology, the standard result is that only share parameters of the production function of …nal output determine the growth-maximizing tax rate (i.e. the volume of public spending) and the growth-maximizing expenditure composition. Moving away from the simple Cobb-Douglas case extends the number of parameters that determine optimal …scal policy and thereby increases the informational requirements. We show that under CES technology and growth maximization, optimal policy is also determined by preference parameters, other technology parameters (in addition to the share parameters), and the stock- ‡ow properties of public inputs (which can be interpreted as the rate of depreciation of public inputs to private production). These results demonstrate that determining optimal …scal policy even under growth maximization is highly complex in practice, and again contrast with the more simple but likely unrealistic case of Cobb-Douglas technology, in particular since for some of these parameters robust empirical estimates are not available. This implies that governments face important informational limitations which in turn gives rise to a second-best situation where the government is unable to set …scal policy parameters at their …rst-best values. The result is also an obvious analogy to the theory of taxation which demonstrates that even in simple static tax models, the optimal tax system depends on a wide range of factors for which it may be di¢ cult to …nd empirical counterparts even when a range of simplifying assumptions is made (Creedy (2009) ). These types of informational limitations are out of bounds for policy makers and cannot be removed directly so that the second-best situation persists. 4 The fact that the stock- ‡ow properties of public inputs to private production do not a¤ect growth-maximizing …scal policy under Cobb-Douglas technology whereas they are important under CES technology is another example of why Cobb-Douglas technology is counterintuitive.
The third contribution is to analyze …scal reform when budget rigidities and imperfect information simultaneously constrain …scal policy. In contrast to above, we now assume that budget rigidities limit the magnitude of …scal policy changes and do not imply that particular …scal policy parameters are completely …xed. Therefore, the government can only implement piecemeal …scal policy changes which take the existing …scal policy as its starting point.
It is shown that in line with standard second-best theory, designing growthenhancing …scal reforms is complex because …scal policy parameters may have to be shifted away from their …rst-best to their second-best values. However, based on our previous arguments, the optimal …scal policy parameter values are unknown in practice so that the optimal size and the optimal direction of …scal policy parameter changes are both unclear. We then show that by limiting the magnitude of policy parameter changes, budget rigidities in fact reduce informational requirement so that in most situations, the design of optimal …scal reform only requires information about the direction of change but not about its magnitude. The reason is the concavity of the growth function which implies that with imperfect knowledge, the expected change of the growth rate of any …scal reform is negative; it is only positive when there is greater certainty about the direction in which …scal parameters must be changed so that they approach their optimal values. We further stress the need for better information by showing that with complementarity, even …scal reforms which are relatively modest in size may result in sizeable and possibly negative changes of the growth rate.
These results have some strong policy implications. First, this new framework suggests that commonly held beliefs about what constitutes optimal …s-cal policy are not valid. In particular, it is shown that household preferences not only a¤ect the growth rate but also the growth-maximizing policy. This contrasts with standard models where the growth-maximizing …scal policy is determined only by share parameters, and where governments can therefore ignore household preferences to set …scal policy in a growth-maximizing way. More importantly, due to second-best interactions in the model, optimal public investment levels may be very low despite the fact that the output elasticity of public capital signi…cantly di¤ers from zero and even though public investment is often seen as the most important public spending category for long-term growth. While our model does not take into account the indirect e¤ects of public capital as for instance in Agénor (2008b), our results still suggest that with low levels of revenue collection which is the case in many developing countries, optimal public investment is much lower than in a …rst-best situation. Second, our results show that the most important information for …scal reform in practice is the direction of the policy parameter change which is likely easier to obtain than information about its magnitude.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and derives the equilibrium of the market economy. Section 3 derives optimal …scal policy under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology in the absence of constraints as a benchmark case. Section 4 demonstrates the impact of budget rigidities on optimal …scal policy when some (but not all) …scal policy parameters are exogenously set below or above their …rst-best levels. Section 7 5 shows that imperfect information is more likely a constraining factor under CES technology because the optimal …scal policy responds to changes of a range of model parameters including the elasticity of substitution, preference parameters and the rate of depreciation of public inputs of which exact empirical estimates may not be available. Section 6 simultaneously considers budget rigidities and imperfect knowledge and analyzes the implications and the informational requirements of …scal reform. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
The public …nance growth framework we adopt in the paper is based on Devarajan et al. (1996) . We extend their model by simultaneously considering public services and public capital as in Tsoukis and Miller (2003) (1996), the e¢ ciency of public spending as in Agénor (2010) and a production function of public services in a similar way as Agénor (2008b) for example.
We assume that there is a large number of in…nitely lived households and …rms that is normalized to one so that …rm entry and exit cancel out or do not occur and population growth is zero.
The representative …rm produces a single composite good using private capital (k) which is broadly de…ned to encompass physical and human capital, and two public inputs, G 1 and G 2 , based on CES technology:
where , 1 and 2 are share parameters with = 1 1 2 . The productivity of private capital used by the individual …rm therefore positively depends on G 1 and G 2 which can be conceived to be provided by di¤erent government sectors (e.g. education and transport infrastructure). For instance, private vehicles can be used more productively when the quality of the road network increases. G 1 and G 2 are non-rival and provided free of charge to the agents of the economy. determines the elasticity of substitution which corresponds to 1 1 . With = 0, the production technology is Cobb-Douglas. 5 We recognize that a more general speci…cation of (1) would be a nested CES function G 1 denotes the amount of productive public services provided by the government (e.g. public law enforcement, public education services), whereas G 2 denotes the stock of public capital (e.g. public infrastructure) which the government accumulates through public investment, _ G 2 . In other words, G 1 can be interpreted as a public input to private production which fully depreciates over one period (i.e. the depreciation rate is 1), and G 2 can be seen as a public input with in…nite lifetime that does not depreciate at all (i.e. the depreciation rate is 0). To capture the notion that factors of production are complements rather than substitutes, it is assumed that 0. This assumption seems justi…ed when considering that public inputs provided by the government fundamentally di¤er from private inputs, such that it may be very costly for …rms to substitute for them. For instance, privately generating electricity is typically much more expensive than using electricity from the public grid.
The government …nances total public expenditure by levying a ‡at tax, , on income, and the government budget is assumed to be always balanced. We further assume that the technical e¢ ciency of public spending may vary.
For instance, ine¢ ciencies arise if the government purchases the inputs for G 1 and G 2 at a high price, or if there is waste due to corrupt bureaucrats. While changing the level of technical e¢ ciency may also involve a resource cost, we refrain from modelling this in greater detail for simplicity because this is not needed to derive our main results in later sections. G 1 itself is produced using two di¤erent inputs, G A and G B , which can be interpreted as sub-sectoral public spending categories, based on CES technology:
with ! = 1 and where " determines the elasticity of substitution. This feature of the model allows for a richer speci…cation of …scal policy because the inter-sectoral allocation (i.e. the allocation of public resources between G 1 and G 2 ) and the sub-sectoral allocation of public resources (i.e. the that allows for di¤erent elasticities of substitution between G 1 and G 2 on the one hand and between G 1 and G 2 taken together and private capital on the other. However, for the purpose of this paper, our speci…cation of the production function is su¢ cient. 9 allocation of public resources between G A and G B ) can be distinguished. It allows us to analyze the e¤ects of misallocation at the sub-sectoral level on the growth-maximizing tax rate and the inter-sectoral composition below. In analogy to the production of …nal output, we assume that " 0 re ‡ects the notion that G A and G B , are complements. For simplicity, we set " = which facilitates the derivation of the results but does not change them qualitatively.
G A and G B may represent the amounts of goods and services and spending on public administration used for the production of G 1 .
Let 1 ( 2 ) determine the inter-sectoral allocation of public resources and denote the share of total public expenditure that is allocated to G 1 ( _ G 2 ) with 1 + 2 = 1 (i.e. the share of resources allocated to public investment is 2 = 1 1 ) and let A ( B ) denote the share of public spending on G 1 that is allocated to G A (G B ) with A + B = 1. Further, let 1 and 2 denote the technical e¢ ciency of public spending on G 1 and G 2 which we assume to be di¤erent from the allocative e¢ ciency. G j (with j = A; B) can therefore be written as
Using (2) and (3), the amount of G 1 can therefore be written as
The level of public investment, _ G 2 , can be written as
We are normalizing k i so that at k i = 1 (with i = 1; 2), public spending is assumed to be perfectly e¢ cient in a technical sense. For simplicity, we assume that increasing the e¢ ciency of public spending is possible at no cost (i.e. increasing k i does not involve a trade-o¤). While in principle, this means that governments would never choose any value for k i below one in the absence of budget rigidities, this assumption merely serves as a simpli…cation and allows asking the hypothetical question about what would happen if public spending was not perfectly e¢ cient. However, to capture the notion that e¢ ciency gains are inevitably limited, we assume that 1 1 and that
The households own the …rms and therefore receive all their output net of taxation which they either reinvest in the …rms to increase their capital stock or which they use for consumption depending on their preferences and the returns on private capital. Private investment by the representative household equals
The representative household chooses the consumption path to maximize lifetime utility U given by
subject to the household's resource constraint given by (6) taking , G 1 , G 2 and k 0 > 0 as given. 6 From the …rst-order conditions, the growth rate of the household's consumption and of the economy can be written in familiar form
In order to ensure that the transversality condition holds and does not constrain the choice of and 1;2 , it is assumed that > 1.
7
Along the balanced growth path, output can be expressed as
Using (9) to substitute for y in (5), and integrating, yields
For the remainder of this section, we assume Cobb-Douglas technology as a means to simplify the analytical expressions. Hence = 0 (and " = 0), and the production function can then be written as
6 The time subscript is omitted whenever possible. A dot over the variable denotes its derivative with respect to time. The initial stock of public capital must also be greater than zero. 7 The transversality condition can be written as lim t!1
[ k] = 0 where is the costate variable of the current-value Hamiltonian. where = 1 1 2 . The marginal product of capital, y k , can be written as
Using (4), (10) and (11) to substitute for G 1 =y, G 2 =y and y=k in (12), and using (12) to substitute for y k in (8) yields
Note that (13) is not an expression of the growth rate but merely an equation that the growth rate satis…es because also appears on the RHS.
The Appendix shows that the equilibrium of the model is saddlepoint stable within relevant parameter ranges, and that the balanced growth path is unique. Along the balanced growth path, c, k, G 1 , G 2 and y all grow at the same rate.
Benchmark Case: Optimal Fiscal Policy with Cobb-Douglas Technology
This section derives optimal …scal policy when output (y) and public services (G 1 ) are produced using Cobb-Douglas technology and when the government does not face constraints under the objective of growth maximization. Apart from the budget constraint and the unavailability of lump-sum taxation, …scal policy is hence not constrained by other factors so that this situation can be considered as …rst-best. This benchmark case will allow us to demonstrate the role of complementarities and government constraints in later sections.
For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that the objective of the government is to maximize growth in contrast to papers that derive the welfare-maximizing …scal policy in similar frameworks as Ghosh and Roy (2004) for example. While in these models, growth and welfare maximization are not identical, in practice, growth maximization is less complex and more common as changes in output are easier to observe than welfare. In addition, the di¤erences in outcomes between growth and welfare maximization in similar models are often small (Misch et al. (2008a) ). Optimal …scal policy therefore refers to the growth-maximizing values of the tax rate and of the public spending shares of public services and public investment (denoted by and 1;2 , respectively). Cobb-Douglas technology implies = " = 0. Since the model is based on the assumption that there is no cost to increase e¢ ciency, the government sets k 1;2 at their maximum values 1;2 to ensure that public spending is fully e¢ cient:
(which obviously maximizes growth and welfare, and which does not depend on the underlying production technology). Implicitly di¤erentiating (13) yields the growth-maximizing income tax rate, , which corresponds to
, the growth-maximizing inter-sectoral expenditure shares, 1;2 , which correspond to
where 1 + 2 = 1, and the growth-maximizing sub-sectoral expenditure shares within G 1 , A;B , which correspond to
and
(15), (16), (17) and (18) These results have important implications with respect to the e¤ects of government constraints even though we did not consider them in this section.
First, second-best interactions cannot arise in the sense that the optimal level of taxation, the optimal public spending composition and the e¢ ciency of public spending are not interrelated. This means for instance that also represents the optimal level of taxation if 1;2 6 = 1;2 and 1;2 < 1. Therefore, 
Optimal Fiscal Policy and Budget Rigidities
This section analyzes optimal …scal policy with CES technology and budget rigidities and therefore considers a more general setting than the previous section. We model budget rigidities by assuming that the government is unable to adjust one or more …scal policy parameters which can then be considered as exogenously given. To some extent, budget rigidities persist in the long run: Major tax reforms and major reallocations of public resources are relatively rare events, even over longer time spans. In particular, we consider four distinct second-best situations. In each of them, one of the four types of …scal policy parameters in the model (we distinguish the technical e¢ ciency of public spending determined by i , the rate of taxation , the inter-sectoral allocative e¢ ciency determined by i , and the sub-sectoral e¢ ciency of public spending determined by j ) is exogenously given and cannot be adjusted by the government due to the presence of budget rigidities. In the …rst three situations, we abstract from the policy problem related to sub-sectoral allocation within G 1 and set = 0 and A = 1 for simplicity.
In situation 1, the technical e¢ ciency of public spending on G 1 is …xed at 1 < 1, whereas and 1;2 are freely adjustable. In situation 2, the level of taxation is exogenously given and possibly suboptimal so that 6 = whereas public spending is fully e¢ cient ( 1;2 = 1) in a technical sense, and the government sets the expenditure shares 1;2 optimally. In situation 3, the expenditure shares of G 1 and G 2 in total public revenue are exogenously given and possibly suboptimal so that 1;2 6 = 1;2 whereas public spending is fully e¢ cient in a technical sense ( 1;2 = 1) and is freely adjustable. In situation 4, we set 0 < < 1 and assume that the sub-sectoral expenditure shares of G A and G B in spending on G 1 are exogenously given and possibly suboptimal so that A;B 6 = A;B whereas public spending is fully e¢ cient ( 1;2 = 1) in a technical sense and as well as 1;2 are freely adjustable.
Although in Section 6, we model budget rigidities in greater detail, for the purpose of this section, it su¢ ces to assume that the government is unable to address budget rigidities directly and that in each of these cases, they fully constrain government discretion with respect to the …scal policy parameters in question.
Given that there is no cost to raise e¢ ciency when the e¢ ciency parameters 1;2 are adjustable (situations 2 and 3), their optimal values correspond to one so that
As discussed above, (15) and (16) imply that under Cobb-Douglas technology, the growth-maximizing tax rate and the growth-maximizing expenditure shares 1;2 and A;B are independent of each other in the sense that deviations from the growth-maximizing tax rate have no impact on the growth-maximizing spending shares and vice versa. In addition, the sub-sectoral public resource allocations and the technical e¢ ciency of public spending neither a¤ect the optimal taxation nor the optimal inter-sectoral public spending composition.
With CES technology, these results fundamentally change in the sense that the …rst-best tax rate and the …rst-best expenditure shares, and 1;2 , are not necessarily identical to their second-best values denoted by and 1;2 , respectively. As closed-form solutions for the optimal policy parameters are not available with public capital, public services and CES production technology for the market economy, we resort to numerical examples to show that the value of ( 1 ) is responsive to changes in 1;2 , 1 and A (to changes in 1;2 , and A ). 1;2 as a function of the e¢ ciency parameter 1 which is exogenously given and which varies between 0.5 and 1. It demonstrates that when 1 < 1, the second-best tax rate, , and the optimal share of resources allocated to G 1 , 1 , exceed the …rst-best tax rate, , and the …rst-best value of 1 , 1 , respectively. The intuition is that with complementarity of the inputs to private production, higher levels of taxation and increased resources allocated to G 1 serve to compensate for low public spending e¢ ciency and thereby prevent the levels of G 1 from falling ine¢ ciently low. This is a standard second-best result: Replicating …rst-best policies in a second-best situation may not be optimal. It can also be shown that the growth rate is still lower and does not attain its …rst-best value. Figure 2 is based on situation 2 and plots the second-best value of 1 , 1 , as a function of which is exogenous and varies between 0 and 1 so that it may deviate from . It likewise demonstrates that when 6 = , the optimal share of public resources allocated to G 1 (the optimal share of public resources allocated to public investment, _ G 2 ) exceeds (falls short of) the one in …rst-best situations; hence 1 > 1 ( 2 < 2 ). The intuition is as follows. G 2 represents the stock of public capital. Current public spending only a¤ects the additions to the stock of capital and but not the existing stock of public capital. When < and 1 = 1 , G 1 drops relatively more than G 2 . With complementarity, it is then e¢ cient to allocate a larger share of public resources to G 1 to mitigate the decrease in overall public resources available. In the opposite case, when > and 1 = 1 , the intuition is less clear. Given the increase of public resources, the levels of G 1 and of G 2 are higher compared to the …rst-best situation. However, as G 2 is a stock variable, G 2 grows faster than G 1 . With complementarity between G 1 and G 2 , it is hence e¢ cient to allocate a greater share of public resources to G 1 so that 1 > 1 . Figure 3 is based on situation 3 and plots the second-best value of , , as a function of 1 which assumes values between 0 and 1 so that it may deviate from 1 . It likewise demonstrates that when 1 6 = 1 , the growthmaximizing level of taxation exceeds the one in a …rst-best situation; hence > . The intuition is similar to situation 1 when 1 is set below one. Under misallocation of public resources at the sectoral level, the overall e¤ec-tiveness of public spending decreases. With complementarity between private and public inputs, it is e¢ cient to compensate for this decrease by increasing the level of taxation (and thereby the level of total public spending). These results demonstrate that under CES technology with complementary factor inputs, budget rigidities have important implications for optimal …scal policy. With regard to optimal taxation and public spending composition, second-best …scal policy parameters may signi…cantly deviate from their …rst-best values. Assuming that in practice, it is unlikely that all …scal policy parameters are set at their …rst-best values and that Cobb-Douglas technology is not common, …rst-best policies have little relevance. Determin-ing second-best policy parameters is however more complex because they are not only a¤ected by exogenous model parameters but also by the values of other policy parameters which hence become interrelated.
In our model, public capital may represent public infrastructure which is commonly assumed to play an important role in the process of economic development. However, even if the share parameter of public capital in private production signi…cantly di¤ers from zero (i.e. 2 > 0), the optimal share of public resources allocated to public capital ( 2 = 1 1 ) in second-best situations may still be relatively small relative to 2 or even close to zero as shown in Figure 2 depending on the rate of taxation which determines the level of public spending. In addition, the share of public resources allocated to public investment depends on the sub-sectoral allocation of public resources within the production of public services (G 1 ) as demonstrated in Cobb-Douglas technology, public capital and public services, the optimal tax rate depends on the composition of public spending and vice versa under welfare maximization. However, they do not discuss this result in detail, and they do not analyze optimal …scal policy in the event when either the tax rate or the composition of public spending is not set at its …rst-best level which makes their results di¢ cult to compare with ours.
Optimal Fiscal Policy and Imperfect Information
This section analyzes the determinants of optimal …scal policy in the absence of budget rigidities with CES technology in greater detail and evaluates whether the assumption of imperfect information is more reasonable under CES technology compared to the benchmark case with Cobb-Douglas technology. The previous section has shown that with CES technology, optimal taxation and public spending composition are not only determined by tech- (15), (16), (17) and (18)). Figure 5 plots the growth-maximizing tax rate, , the growth-maximizing expenditure share of total government revenue allocated to G 1 , 1 , and the growth-maximizing sub-sectoral share of resources allocated to G A , A , as a function of (which determines the elasticity of substitution) in a …rst-best situation. Given that the slopes deviate from zero, Figure 5 suggests that and 1;2 are highly sensitive to the choice of the elasticity of substitution. In addition, with < 0, the stock‡ow properties of the public inputs also impact on the growth-maximizing …scal policy. This can be seen by noting that even though 2 (the share parameter associated with G 2 ) exceeds 1 , the optimal expenditure share 1 may exceed 0.5 (and hence 2 ) when < 0. In contrast, when Cobb-Douglas technology is assumed and when 2 > 1 , (16) technology. The intuition is that the level of G 2 (which is a stock variable) is typically higher than the level of G 1 (which is only derived from the ‡ow of public spending). With complementarity, it is then optimal to increase the share of public resources allocated to G 1 and to increase overall public revenue through higher taxation. Both measures serve to increase the level of G 1 . In contrast, the optimal sub-sectoral allocation represented by A does not respond to exogenous changes in because G A and G B are both derived from the ‡ow of public spending.
Figures 6 and 7 plot the growth-maximizing tax rate, , and the growthmaximizing expenditure shares, 1 and A , as a function of (which determines the households'intertemporal elasticity of substitution) and of the discount parameter . Given that the slopes are not zero, it can be seen that with CES technology, both preference parameters also determine and 1 .
While Figures 6 and 7 suggest that the sensitivity of and 1 to changes in and is limited because the slope is not steep, this result is still novel. While under welfare maximization, it seems plausible that household preferences a¤ect optimal …scal policy, under growth maximization which is the case we consider it may be counterintuitive because in our model, …scal policy only directly impacts on private production and income (and not on utility). Intuitively, this result directly follows from the model assumptions of complementarity and the fact that the government accumulates public capital.
Complementarity essentially implies that in addition to the share parameters of the production function and the cost of generating public revenue, it is the level of private capital which determines the optimal level of the public inputs. However, the government is unable to manipulate the stock of public capital directly because contrary to public services, it is not derived from the ‡ow of public spending but accumulated over time similarly to private capital. The growth-maximizing rate of public investment therefore depends on the rate of private investment which in turn can be shown to depend on preference parameters. This ensures that the level of public capital depends on the level of private capital as dictated by complementarity. In contrast and as above, the optimal sub-sectoral allocation represented by A does not respond to exogenous changes in and . This means that the allocation of public resources between two public services solely depends on share parameters in the production function even with CES technology.
These results further stress that even within simple models and under the simplifying assumption of growth maximization as the government objective and in the absence of budget rigidities, setting …scal policy in an optimal way is highly complex. The reason is that optimal …scal policy depends on a range of exogenous model parameters of which robust empirical estimates may be hard to obtain in practice. While our model is highly abstract and excludes many features of …scal policy, these results nevertheless suggest that the complexity of determining growth-maximizing …scal policy is most likely to exceed government capacity in practice. In more realistic and hence more complex models, the range of parameters which determine optimal …scal policy is likely to increase further. Thus, with CES technology, it is much more reasonable to assume that imperfect information constrains …scal policy so that the government is unable to determine optimal taxation and expenditure composition.
Fiscal Reform with Budget Rigidities and Imperfect Knowledge
This section simultaneously considers budget rigidities and imperfect knowledge which are both modelled in greater detail and analyzes the implications of …scal reform that takes current …scal policy as its starting point using numerical examples. The previous sections have considered budget rigidities with CES technology, budget rigidities may give rise to important secondbest interactions and that imperfect information is more likely to represent a problem for governments than in the case of Cobb-Douglas technology.
We now extend the previous sections by assuming that both factors simultaneously constrain the government and prevent it from setting the …scal policy parameters at their …rst-best values. For simplicity, we again abstract from sub-sectoral allocation by assuming that = 0 and A = 1. First, the government faces informational limitations or imperfect knowledge: while we assume that the government knows that , G 1 and G 2 impact on the growth rate, that the growth rate is concave in and 1;2 and that it is increasing in 1;2 , it neither knows the …rst-best nor the second-best values of and 1;2 .
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The previous sections showed that with CES technology, optimal …scal pol- 8 These assumptions mirror the fact that governments still have some knowledge about private agents even if they do not know the exact values of technology and preference parameters: economic theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that very low levels of public spending and very high levels of taxation are detrimental for private investment. It is this type of evidence that governments are aware of and which implies that optimal …scal policy lies somewhere in between these extremes and that the growth rate is therefore a concave function. Our notion of imperfect information does therefore not imply that governments refrain from using …scal policy to maximize the growth rate. shown in the previous section, there is no guarantee that adjusting and 1;2 in the direction of their …rst-best values, and 1;2 , enhances growth which increases complexity even further. In contrast, the government knows that increasing e¢ ciency always raises the growth rate, and that 1;2 = 1 (which is reasonable given that there are no cost involved in raising 1;2 ). As a starting point, we assume that the economy is currently not at its growth optimum which implies that the …scal policy parameters ( , 1;2 and 1;2 ) are not set at their …rst-best values:
1;2 6 = 1;2 (20) In addition, we assume that the government faces budget rigidities. In contrast to Section 4, we now assume that budget rigidities merely limit the extent to which …scal policy parameters are adjustable and that they a¤ect all policy parameters. On the one hand, they limit the number of policy adjustments that are feasible over an extended period of time.
9 This is realistic: government capacity and political capital are inevitably limited so that governments can only focus on few issues at a time. We count a change in the tax rate , an increase of one e¢ ciency parameter ( 1;2 ) and two o¤setting changes in the composition of public setting (e.g. an increase in 1 and a decrease in 2 so that 4 1 = 4 2 ) each as one policy change.
For simplicity, we assume that governments are only able to make one policy adjustment. On the other hand, budget rigidities limit the magnitude of each policy adjustment. While the degree of ‡exibility of each …scal policy parameter di¤ers, we assume that budget rigidities are meaningful in the sense that feasible policy adjustments do not allow a complete shift to the optimal parameter values (otherwise, budget rigidities would not constrain government policy). The largest feasible adjustments of 1;2 , and 1;2 in absolute terms (denoted by a , a and a ) are
where r ; r ; r de…ne the ‡exibility of each parameter and where 0 < r ; r ; r < 1
(26) ensures that budget rigidities constrain …scal policy parameters so that they cannot be set at their optimal values (otherwise budget rigidities would not be a constraint for …scal policy).
In this type of situation, the policy problem is therefore to identify the …scal reform (i.e. the …scal policy adjustment) which enhances growth most and which is feasible under our speci…cation of budget rigidities. Governments can either lower or raise 1 (o¤set by an adjustment of 2 ) by up to a , they can raise or lower by up to a , or they can raise 1 or 2 by up to a , respectively. From (23), (24) and (25), the maximum feasible adjustment is always smaller than the adjustment required to reach the optimal parameter value which implies that it is optimal to adjust 1;2 , , or 1;2 by a , a , and a , respectively (i.e. by the largest feasible amount and not by less in absolute terms). In other words, while there is an in…nite number of distinct policy parameter adjustments, the policy problem is to choose one out of six di¤erent ones ( 1 + a o¤set by corresponding changes in 2 , + a , 1 + a and 2 + a ). Table 1 contains details about the scenarios. In order to ensure comparability between the scenarios, the change of the growth rate is expressed as a share of potential growth (i.e. the growth rate under growth-maximizing …scal policy in a …rst-best situation). For instance, under scenario 1 which assumes Cobb-Douglas technology and which assumes < , 1 > 1 and 1;2 < 1, raising the rate of taxation results in the greatest increase of the growth rate (the growth rate increases by about 5% in terms of potential growth), whereas lowering the tax rate results in a fall of the growth rate by about 14%. Comparing the changes of the growth rate under scenarios 1 and 2 which only di¤er with respect to the production technology (scenario 1 assumes Cobb-Douglas, whereas scenario 2 assumes CES technology) shows that complementarity between the inputs to private production implies that …scal reform has much greater e¤ects in relative terms under CES technology. Comparing scenarios 2 and 4 shows that obviously, the initial values of the …scal policy parameters also impact on the optimal policy adjustment. Under imperfect knowledge, the government does not know the response of the growth rate to policy parameter adjustments. Conceptually, it is useful to distinguish two types of mistakes the government can make. First, it may pick a policy adjustment which results in a reduction of the growth rate. Second, it may pick a policy adjustment which enhances growth but to a lesser extent compared to the case when the optimal policy adjustment is chosen. Obviously, the priority is to avoid the …rst mistake which can be seen as more costly than the second one. How likely is it that the growth rate will decrease as a result of policy parameter adjustments? While the government knows that increasing 1 and 2 unambiguously increases the growth rate, imperfect knowledge implies that it has no information about and 1;2 which means that it does not know how changes of and 1;2 a¤ect the growth rate (i.e. the government does not know whether increasing or decreasing and 1;2 raises the growth rate). A risk-neutral imperfectly informed government will therefore assign equal probability weights to either outcome (i.e. the government will assign a probability of 1=2 to both an increase and a decrease of the growth rate as a result of changing and 1;2 ). These probabilities allow the calculation of the expected change of the growth rate that results from adjusting and 1;2 which is simply the average of the absolute increase and the absolute decrease of the growth rate. Figure 8 implies that this average is unambiguously negative for and 1;2 in all scenarios. In other words, while the government is unable to calculate the exact magnitude of the expected change of the growth rate due to imperfect knowledge, it does know that the expected change of the growth rate from adjusting and 1;2 by a discrete amount is negative. For instance, under scenario 2, the decrease of the growth rate that results from decreasing by a exceeds the increase of the growth rate that 28 Figure 8 : Changes of the growth rate as a result of …scal policy adjustments results from increasing by a . Figure 9 illustrates this point using a numerical example which assumes Cobb-Douglas technology. It plots the growth rate as a function of = (so that at = = 1, the tax rate is set at its …rst-best value). Suppose that the economy is initially at point A. Increasing the tax rate by a raises the growth rate, and the economy attains point B, whereas in the opposite case with a decrease in the rate of taxation, the growth rate falls to point C. Imperfect knowledge implies that the government does not know whether = < 1 or = > 1 (i.e. whether the tax rate is below or above its optimal value). In other words, the government could equally assume that the economy is at point A 0 where lowering taxation results in a shift to point B 0 where the growth rate is higher. The concavity of the growth curve implies that shifting the rate of taxation away from its optimal value has always a 29 greater absolute impact on the growth rate than shifting the rate of taxation towards its optimal value which explains why the expected change of the growth rate is negative. This result only holds when the adjustment of and 1;2 are discrete (i.e. non-marginal). Figure 9 : Possible changes of the growth rate as a result of tax rate adjustments
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The result of a negative expected change in the growth rate due to adjustments of and 1;2 is that imperfectly informed governments refrain from adjusting them and therefore choose to increase k 1;2 only. The reason is that there is always full certainty that raising 1 and 2 will increase the growth rate. However, as Figure 8 demonstrates, governments then risk to commit the second mistake of not choosing the policy adjustment which increases the growth rate most.
The solution for this dilemma is to exploit the fact that budget rigidities constrain …scal policy discretion and thereby reduce informational requirements to identify the optimal and feasible policy parameter adjustment. In order to avoid growth-reducing adjustments, information about the 'growthenhancing'direction of the optimal adjustment of and 1;2 is su¢ cient. This information appears to be more readily available than information about the exact values of the optimal policy parameters. Since budget rigidities imply that feasible policy adjustments are always smaller than policy adjustments required to attain the optimal values of and , governments do not require information about the optimal magnitude which would arguably be much harder to obtain. This allows governments to avoid the …rst mistake for all …scal policy parameters.
Avoiding the second mistake then requires criteria to select the optimal …scal reform among those which augment the growth rate. This does not require a comparison of the change in the growth rate of all policy adjustments in absolute terms. Rather, under budget rigidities, it may be su¢ cient to identify the policy adjustment which results in the largest increase of the growth rate which implies that only a comparison of the change of the growth rate in relative terms is required.
Conclusions
This paper has shown that Cobb-Douglas technology which is commonly assumed in most endogenous growth models with public …nance has in some respect counterintuitive and misleading implications for growth-maximizing …scal policy. This paper has also justi…ed that second-best situations are likely to arise in the context of …scal policy, and that with CES technology, second-best interactions have important implications for optimal …scal policy under growth maximization. The main result here is that in second-best situations, the optimal level of taxation is likely higher, and the optimal share of investment is lower compared to a …rst-best situation. While in practice, public infrastructure is often seen as particularly important for economic development, this may only apply for a …rst-best situation. A natural extension would be to derive the welfare-maximizing …scal policy within the same framework and compare the results to the growth-maximizing equivalent which we however leave for future research. In the same way, a useful extension of the model would be to examine whether second-best interactions also alter the optimal allocation between public expenditure categories other than those considered in this paper. The paper has also considered the sources of divergence from a …rst-best situations that give rise to a second-best one. In addition to budget rigidities, complexity is likely to exceed government capacity and expertise which gives rise to imperfect knowledge. In turn, second-best interactions increase informational requirements to determine the optimal values of …scal policy parameters further. However, our results also suggest that when …scal policy discretion is limited due to budget rigidities, informational requirements are likely to decrease. In particular, in order to implement growth-enhancing …scal policy reforms, only the …scal policy parameter to be adjusted and the direction of the adjustment must be chosen. In contrast, the optimal magnitude of …scal policy adjustments or the second-best values of …scal policy parameters do typically not have to be known for the design of growthenhancing …scal reforms. It is interesting to contrast our analysis of …scal reform with the one by Ahmad and Stern (1984) . Their objective is to identify welfare-improving tax changes which do not decrease tax revenue. They develop a simple static model with many goods which are all subject to speci…c taxes and which are consumed by the households who receive …xed and untaxed factor incomes. This framework enables to derive the marginal cost in terms of social welfare of raising an additional unit of government revenue from taxing a given good. If this marginal cost di¤ers for two goods, welfare-improving tax reforms are feasible. Apart from the fact that they consider a welfare function which takes into account value judgements whereas we assume that aggregate growth is the objective function of the government, there are other important di¤erences between their analysis and ours. First, our modelling framework is di¤erent. Whereas they consider di¤erent types of indirect taxes and implicitly take public spending requirements as exogenously given, we consider income taxation, di¤erent public expenditure categories and model the e¤ects of public spending which implies that the optimal level of public spending is endogenously determined. Their condition for welfare-improving tax reforms is therefore not directly applicable in the context of this paper.
Second, they consider the fact that their analysis is limited to the direction of …scal adjustments (and excludes the size) as a disadvantage. In contrast, by explicitly modelling budget rigidities, we extend Ahmad and Stern (1984) in two important ways. On the one hand, we showed that the assumption that only small …scal policy adjustments are feasible is realistic. On the other hand and more importantly, we presented compelling evidence that with concave objective functions, information about the direction of …scal adjustment is most important.
A Appendix Given the complexity of the matrix, it is easier to verify numerically that this condition holds. For most sensible examples with sensible parameter values that we used, this condition is satis…ed.
